An Ignition Gateway is a web server, so securing it starts as for any web application: HTTPS with a proper certificate, then control over who may sign in and what each person may change. This article follows the Ignition 8.3 user manual and Inductive Automation's Security Hardening Guide for 8.3, and notes where the 8.1 manual differs. What Ignition is: What is Ignition.
1. What Gateway security protects
The 8.3 security overview names two critical areas: the Gateway webpage and the Designer, where devices, databases, tags and projects are configured. The hardening guide explains why the Designer weighs as much: anyone allowed to modify projects can write Python scripts that the Gateway runs with all the privileges of the Ignition process, including its access to devices and databases.
Ignition has two authentication strategies. Classic uses user sources and applies to the Designer and Vision only; the identity provider (IdP) strategy works for Perspective, Vision, the Designer and the Gateway webpage. Sign-in per visualisation module: Ignition Vision vs Perspective.
2. HTTPS on the Gateway web server
Ignition defaults to TLS 1.2 and 1.3 once a valid certificate is installed. The default ports are 8088 for HTTP and 8043 for HTTPS, set under Network > Network Settings > Web Server in 8.3 (Config > Networking > Web Server in 8.1). Force Secure Redirect, off by default, sends clients, Designers and browsers from HTTP to the HTTPS port. The hardening guide calls HTTPS the first and most important step.
Setup SSL/TLS on that page imports a certificate or generates a certificate signing request (CSR) with a Common Name, normally the DNS name typed in the browser, and Subject Alternative Names for the server's IP addresses and DNS names. The guide strongly recommends a certificate from a reputable certificate authority (CA); the manual also accepts the organisation's internal CA. A self-signed certificate encrypts but proves no identity, and browsers warn against it. The web server answers ACME HTTP challenges, so certificates can be renewed without stopping the Gateway.
Excluded Cipher Suites removes weak suites; the guide says the Gateway is only as protected as the weakest suite allowed. The manual calls Use Proxy Forwarded Headers a security risk when users can reach the Gateway directly. The certificate covers incoming connections only: database, OPC UA and device connections opened by the Gateway are secured separately.
3. Who signs in: user sources and identity providers
A user source holds users and roles: Internal, Database, Active Directory, two hybrids in which Active Directory checks the password while roles stay in Ignition or a database, and a fallback cache. By default an account locks after 5 failed attempts within 15 minutes, and Internal passwords need at least 8 characters. For Active Directory the guide asks for LDAPS, which is not the default.
An identity provider authenticates the user outside Ignition and returns attributes and roles. Ignition supports its internal IdP, OpenID Connect 1.0 and SAML 2.0; multi-factor sign-in comes from the provider. The Gateway is registered with a redirect URI ending in /data/federate/callback/oidc or /data/federate/callback/saml, and the manual says production systems should use the https form. For badge sign-in on the internal IdP, the guide recommends Badge Secret, so a stolen badge still needs the password.
4. Security levels, roles and security zones
Security levels are a tree defined on the Gateway, in which each child inherits the security of its parents. Four are reserved: Public, granted to everyone including users not signed in; Authenticated, after a successful IdP login; Authenticated/Roles, whose children must match the IdP's role names exactly; and SecurityZones, filled from the Gateway's zones. Custom levels are granted by Security Level Rules, expressions that can read IdP attributes, zones and tag values, evaluated at login. These levels are an access hierarchy inside Ignition, unrelated to the SL 1 to SL 4 of IEC 62443.
A security zone groups connections by IP address (wildcards and ranges allowed), host name or Gateway name, then filters them with qualifiers such as Require Secure Connection or whether Client, Designer or Gateway scope is allowed. Where zones overlap, the highest priority applies; anything else lands in the Default zone, which cannot be edited. Each zone gets a policy for services such as tag access, history, alarms and the audit log. Under the Default zone, a remote Gateway can acknowledge alarms, query history and read tags, but not write them. Projects store zone names as text, so renaming a zone breaks the security that uses it.
5. Gateway webpage, Designer and tag permissions
Under Platform > Security > General Settings, 8.3 grants Gateway Write, Read and Access permissions by security level; Write includes Read, and Read includes Access. The hardening guide states that by default the Platform, Connections, Network, Services and Diagnostics sections require Authenticated/Roles/Administrator. The 8.1 page has separate Gateway Config, Status Page and Home Page permissions instead.
In the Designer, Project Properties > Permissions set the roles needed to view, save or delete the project and to open protected resources. If none are set, every Designer user can do all of it. Tags carry Read Permissions and Write Permissions, both Public by default, and a Read Only property, applied in every window and view that uses the tag. Perspective adds required security levels per session, view and component event.
6. Gateway Network trust
Gateways connect to each other on port 8060 by default, over SSL. Require SSL is true by default, and in 8.3 Require Two Way Auth is true on new installations, so each side must hold the other's certificate as well as approve the connection. The Connection Policy is ApprovedOnly by default, or Unrestricted or SpecifiedList. Allow Java Serialization is off on new 8.3 Gateways but turned on by an upgrade from 8.1; the guide says to leave it off unless 8.1 Gateways still need it, and to create the outgoing connection from the Gateway in the more secure zone, so the firewall needs only outbound rules. Upgrade effects: Ignition 8.1 to 8.3 upgrade.
On a redundant pair, the web server certificate is installed again on the Backup, while Gateway Network certificates are pushed from the Master. The guide's firewall rule on the main server accepts the Gateway Network port from the backup server's IP address. More: Ignition redundancy.
7. Audit profiles
Auditing needs an audit profile and then a switch: Gateway Audit Profile in the general security settings for Gateway actions, and Enable Auditing in Project Properties for each project. A Database profile writes to a table named AUDIT_EVENTS by default, an Internal profile needs no SQL database, and a Remote profile sends events to another Gateway. Database and Internal profiles keep records for 90 days by default. Recorded actions include logins, lockouts, tag writes and edits, project saves, Gateway configuration changes, backup restores and certificate uploads. API calls that change configuration are recorded with the user, IP address and API key; GET requests are not. The guide recommends an audit database user that can only select and insert.
8. Ports the manual lists
| Port | Default use, per the 8.3 port reference |
|---|---|
| 8088 TCP | Gateway webpage and clients over HTTP; also the non-SSL Gateway Network port |
| 8043 TCP | Gateway webpage and clients over HTTPS |
| 8060 TCP | Gateway Network over SSL |
| 62541 TCP | Ignition OPC UA server |
| 6501 TCP | Vision Local Client Fallback |
| 44818 and 2222 TCP | outgoing, Allen-Bradley drivers |
The guide's rule is to close all ports by default and open only those the configuration needs. Firewall design around a control system: FactoryTalk and Logix firewall ports.
9. Other hardening guide items
- Run the service under a dedicated local account without Administrator rights; a default Windows installation runs it as SYSTEM.
- Keep the Gateway the main or only application on its host, and on Windows disable Remote Registry and Windows Remote Management.
- Connect to databases with a limited account, never root or sa.
- Change the default credentials of the opcua-module user source, and use SignAndEncrypt for OPC UA where supported. Native PLC protocols often lack encryption and authentication and depend on segmentation; for Allen-Bradley see CIP Security.
- Check that installers are signed by Inductive Automation, LLC and that modules show trusted certificates.
- In 8.3 the default secrets encryption key is the same on every installation; a custom key protects better, but lost keys cannot be recovered, even by Inductive Automation support.
What we check first
This is TDL's practice, not an Inductive Automation requirement.
- We open the Gateway webpage over HTTPS and read the certificate: issuer, names matching how operators reach the server, expiry date, and whether Force Secure Redirect is on.
- We list who can sign in: user sources, identity providers, default and shared accounts, and the security levels behind Gateway Write and Designer access.
- We check write permissions on command and setpoint tags, and on Perspective views and events that write.
- We list Gateway Network connections, their approval policy and zones, and whether Java serialization is still on.
- We confirm that an audit profile is assigned to the Gateway and every project.
- We compare open ports and the Windows service account with the port reference and the plant's firewall rules (Rockwell PLC security covers the controller side).
How TDL approaches it
TDL Industrial Automation is an Ignition Certified Integrator. We set up Gateway security with the plant's IT team, who usually own the certificates, the directory or identity provider, and the firewall rules. More on these services: Ignition SCADA integrator in Vietnam and Industrial networks and OT security.
Frequently asked questions
Which ports does an Ignition Gateway use for HTTP and HTTPS?
By default 8088 for HTTP and 8043 for HTTPS. With Force Secure Redirect enabled, HTTP requests are sent to the HTTPS port. Gateway-to-Gateway traffic uses 8060 over SSL.
Is a self-signed certificate enough for an Ignition Gateway?
It encrypts the traffic but does not prove the server's identity, and browsers warn users. The hardening guide strongly recommends a certificate from a reputable certificate authority, and the manual accepts an organisation's internal CA.
What is the difference between a user source and an identity provider in Ignition?
A user source holds users and roles in Ignition, a SQL database or Active Directory and serves the Classic strategy for the Designer and Vision. An identity provider authenticates users outside Ignition through OpenID Connect or SAML, or Ignition's internal IdP, and is the strategy Perspective uses.
What is a security zone in Ignition?
A group of connections identified by IP address, host name or Gateway name, filtered by qualifiers such as Require Secure Connection. Each zone gets a service policy for tags, history, alarms and audit logs, and a connection that matches no zone falls into the Default zone.
What does the Ignition audit log record?
Logins, lockouts, tag writes and edits, project saves, Gateway configuration changes, backup restores and certificate uploads, among others. Auditing is switched on per Gateway and per project, and API calls that change configuration are recorded, while GET requests are not.
Sources
- Inductive Automation, Security and Gateway General Security Settings (8.3; 8.1 page compared), Ignition 8.3 user manual
- Inductive Automation, Web Server Settings and Secure Communication (SSL/TLS) (8.3; 8.1 page compared)
- Inductive Automation, Classic Authentication Strategy, Internal Authentication, Identity Provider Authentication Strategy and Configuring Identity Providers, Ignition 8.3
- Inductive Automation, Security Levels, Security Level Rules, Security Zones and Service Security Policies, Ignition 8.3
- Inductive Automation, Project Security in the Designer, Tag Security Properties and Security in Perspective, Ignition 8.3
- Inductive Automation, Gateway Network and Gateway Network Certificates and SSL, Ignition 8.3
- Inductive Automation, Audit Log and Profiles, Auditing Actions Reference and API Keys, Ignition 8.3
- Inductive Automation, Gateway Port Reference, Secrets Management and Installing and Upgrading Ignition, Ignition 8.3
- Inductive Automation, Ignition Security Hardening Guide, version 8.3 (PDF, page last updated 4 September 2026) — pp. 5–11, 15–20, 22, 24
Read 15 November 2026. This article paraphrases the sources and does not quote them; read the original documents before designing or working on a system.